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Dr. CARB or: How I Learned to Stop
Worrying About the Feds and Love
States’ Rights
Dan Strong*
Abstract
Climate change is one of the largest environmental
problems the world is currently facing. At the forefront of the
climate change issue is the problem of carbon emissions.
Environmentalists were hopeful that a national regulatory
structure would be created with the enactment of the Clean Air
Act in the 1970s. Since its enactment, however, it is clear the
Clean Air Act was not the solution to the national carbon
emissions problem environmentalists were hoping for. With the
federal government failing to act, states have taken it upon
themselves to regulate carbon emissions. California, with its
enactment of the California Low Carbon Fuel Standard, has
taken important steps to reduce carbon emissions through the
regulation of carbon production in the creation of alternative
fuels. But regulation of an interstate problem raises certain
constitutional issues, namely the dormant Commerce Clause. The
dormant Commerce Clause is the inverse of the Commerce
Clause found in Article I, Section 8, clause 3 of the United States
Constitution, which gives Congress the power to regulate
commerce among the several states. Inversely, the dormant
Commerce Clause prohibits a state from regulating commerce
that extends beyond its borders. The United States Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals recently held that California’s Fuel Standard
did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. This Note
*
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analyzes the California Low Carbon Fuel Standard and the
ruling of the Ninth Circuit. Based on this analysis, this Note
explains what will and will not work when drafting emissions
regulations after the Ninth Circuit’s decision. Finally, this Note
makes recommendations to state legislatures attempting to draft
carbon emissions regulations. These recommendations will
hopefully aid states in drafting legislation that will avoid
dormant Commerce Clause violations.
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I. Introduction
Modern environmentalists have looked at the federal
government of the United States of America as the defender of
the environment.1 Since the creation of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) in December 1970, environmentalists
1.
See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:
LAW SCIENCE AND POLICY 90–91 (6th ed. 2009) (describing the rise of the modern
environmentalism movement which called for federal action to protect the
environment).
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have had high hopes for national regulation of the environment.2
These hopes were fueled with the passage of legislation like the
Clean Air Act (CAA)3 and Clean Water Act (CWA).4 But the
federal government has yet to institute nation-wide regulatory
schemes to protect the emission of greenhouse gasses.5 Proposed
global warming legislation stalled in the United States Congress
and has little chance of being passed in the near future. 6 As a
result, the some states have created their own climate change
legislation.7 Due to the lack of federal legislation, states are left
with the option of becoming the “laboratories of experimentation”
described by former Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis. 8
Climate change, pollution, and protection of natural
resources are difficult problems for states to address in the

2.
See id. at 91 (noting how by 1970, environmental causes
became ‘the favorite sacred issue of all politicians, all TV networks, all
goodwilled people of any party’, citing THEODORE WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE
PRESIDENT 45 (1973)).
3.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7545 (West) (providing for the regulation of
fuels).
4.
See generally 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
5.
See Nicholas Loris, Congress Should Stop Regulations of
Greenhouse Gases, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Sept. 23, 2013), available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/09/congress-should-stopregulations-of-greenhouse-gases (giving the background of the EPA’s regulation
of carbon-dioxide) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
6.
Ben Geman, Heat Wave, Fires have Climate Change Activists
Going on the Offensive, THE HILL, (July 6, 2012, 10:00AM),
http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/236391-heat-wave-fires-leavesome-climate-change-supporters-looking-to-go-on-offense (explaining that there
is little hope for climate change legislation from Congress after the 2010 bill
failed) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE AND
THE ENVIRONMENT).
7.
See State Legislation from Around the Country, CENTER FOR
CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS (last visited Dec. 1, 2014, 3:44 PM),
http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/key-legislation (listing the various state
programs to address climate change) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
8.
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught
with serious consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country.”).
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United States’ federalist system.9 One of the biggest challenges
facing states in their regulation of the environment is the
constitutionality of the statutory schemes that would be required
to regulate air pollution.10 States run the risk of regulating
beyond their borders, protecting in-state interests at the expense
out-of-state economies.11 According to one legal scholar, “[w]ith
traditional environmental, command-and-control regulation,
states can target air emissions, water pollution, and land use
practices of facilities located wholly within state borders and
often achieve meaningful progress. These approaches, however,
are of limited effect in the area of climate change because of its
national and international scope.”12 States also run the risk of
regulating beyond their place in the federalist system.13 Due to
the nature of environmental issues states are attempting to
regulate, the efficacy of the regulatory scheme is dependent on
the state’s ability to influence action in the stream of interstate
commerce, the regulation of which is enumerated to Congress in
the Constitution of the United States.14
As Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution, also
known as the Commerce Clause, establishes, “[t]he Congress
shall have the Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.”15 In contrast, the dormant, or negative, view on the
Commerce Clause represents the concept that, because Congress
has the enumerated power to regulate interstate commerce, the
9.
See Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause,
27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 60–65 (2003) (discussing the different viewpoints
regarding environmental protection and federalism).
10.
See Klein, supra note 9, at 1–3 (introducing how the commerce
clause affects a state’s ability to regulate environmental issues).
11.
See Klein, supra note 9, at 3 (“Such state efforts may have
economic consequences for the free market and economic benefits for the
regulating state, thus treading perilously close to the Court's expanding view of
economic protectionism forbidden under the commerce clause.”).
12.
Alexandra B. Klass, Climate Change and the Convergence of
Environmental and Energy Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 180, 198 (2013)
(citations omitted).
13.
See Klein, supra note 9, at 5 (highlighting instances when
environmental measures have been invalidated as violating the Commerce
Clause).
14.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3 (granting Congress the
power to regulate interstate commerce).
15.
Id.
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states are forbidden from doing so.16 The purpose of the dormant
Commerce Clause is the avoidance of economic and political
protectionism created through state and local statutory
schemes.17 Throughout history, the dormant Commerce Clause
has been used by out-of-state entities to attack environmental
regulations they claim unconstitutionally hinder their ability to
compete in a particular state’s marketplace.18
Even with this significant barrier to state action, state
regulation of the environment is the best, if not the only, option
available for regulating greenhouse gasses. This Note will focuses
on a recent challenge undertaken by the Rocky Mountain
Farmers Union (RMFU) against a regulatory scheme enacted by
the State of California.19 The District Court for the Eastern
District of California determined that California violated the
dormant Commerce Clause when it attempted to regulate carbon
emissions in transportation fuels.20 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit overruled the district court decision, which
provides a beacon for states and environmentalists alike. 21 This
Note will analyze the rulings of the two courts and assess their
impact on state legislation in the field, discussing what
regulations will still work, what will not work, and where state
regulatory schemes can go from here.22 Because of California’s
16.
See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 3 (1824) (stating that no part
of the power to regulate interstate commerce can be exercised by the States).
17.
See Andrew D. Thompson, Public Health, Environmental
Protection, and the Dormant Commerce Clause: Maintaining State Sovereignty
in the Federalist Structure, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 213, 219 (2004) (describing
the purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause as the prevention of potential
hostilities due to economic protectionism and the protection of natural
resources).
18.
See infra Part II.
19.
See generally Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730
F.3d 1070 (2013) (reviewing California’s Fuel Standard).
20.
See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070,
1086 (2013) (concluding California’s efforts “violated the dormant Commerce
Clause by (1) engaging in extraterritorial regulation, (2) facially discriminating
against out-of-state ethanol, and (3) discriminating against out-of-state crude oil
in purpose and effect”); see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95480 (2010) (giving
the purpose of California’s low-carbon fuel standard legislation).
21.
See Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d. at 1078 (finding the regulation
did not “facially discriminate against out-of-state commerce”).
22.
See Sarah Kunkleman, Attorneys Say States Can Protect
Against Constitutional Challenges to Climate Rules, 199 DAILY ENVTL. REP.
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unique position as the only state permitted by Congress to
attempt regulation of emissions from motor vehicles, the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling is important as a guide for states attempting to
enact legislation to regulate emissions. The ruling of the Ninth
Circuit can be viewed as a preview of dormant Commerce Clause
challenges to state regulation of other sources of greenhouse
gasses.
Part II of this Note will focus on the history of dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence from its theoretical development
to its more modern analysis. Part III analyzes the text of
California’s Fuel Standard. Part IV discusses RMFU’s challenge
to the Fuel Standard in the federal trial and appellate courts.
Part V analyzes what drafting techniques, in light of RMFU’s
recent appellate court challenge, states can employ so
environmental protection legislation will not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause. Namely, states can ensure their legislation
pursues a permissible aim, utilizes geographic factors that are
directly tied to the reduction of carbon emissions and not to the
protection of local economies, and finally employs alternative
regulatory structures. Generally, this Note attempts to show
that, while federal action in the forum of greenhouse gasses is
lacking, state regulations can be an effective way of controlling
the issue.

II. History of the Dormant Commerce Clause
The dormant Commerce Clause is not an actual clause in
the Constitution.23 “It is the Court which has imposed the policy
under the dormant Commerce Clause . . . .”24 The dormant
Commerce Clause finds its origins in the interstate commerce

(BNA), at A-1 (Oct. 15, 2013) (opining that states can protect against dormant
Commerce Clause challenges when drafting legislation).
23.
See Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant
Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 Duke L.J.
569, 571 (“[T]he simple fact is that there is no dormant commerce clause to be
found within the text or textual structure of the constitution.”).
24.
W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 217 (1994)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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clause and its contours have been developed over the years
through judicial interpretation.25

A. Theoretical Development
The Supreme Court first addressed the “negative”
Commerce Clause in Gibbons v. Ogden.26 Though the holding of
Gibbons relied specifically on Article 6, Clause 2 of the
Constitution, known as the Supremacy Clause, the dicta of Chief
Justice John Marshall’s opinion seemed to lay the groundwork for
virtually exclusive federal power over interstate commerce
through the dormant Commerce Clause.27 This exclusive federal
power is created by two restrictions on state power from the
Commerce Clause.28 As one legal scholar has stated, “First,
Congress can preempt state law merely by exercising its
Commerce Clause power. Second, the Commerce Clause itself—
absent action by Congress—restricts state power; the grant of
federal power implies a corresponding restriction of state
power.”29 This implicit restriction on states limits their ability to
regulate intrastate activities that impact interstate activities.30
In Gibbons, New York attempted to monopolize the
licensing of steamboat operators on New York waters.31 The New
York law was enforced to the exclusion of other state licenses and

25.
See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970);
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131
(1986).
26.
See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 19–20(1824) (highlighting the
uncertain application of the Commerce Clause in areas where Congress has not
yet legislated).
27.
See Klein, supra note 9, at 23–24 (explaining Chief Justice
Marshall’s desire to establish a vast and exclusive federal commerce power
limited only by the Constitution itself); See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 3 (noting the
power to regulate commerce is general, and has no limitations except those that
are prescribed in the Constitution itself).
28.
See Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed Economics of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1191–92 (1998) (explaining the
restrictions placed on state power by the Commerce Clause).
29.
Id. at 1192 (citations omitted).
30.
See id. at 1191 (describing the impact of the dormant
Commerce Clause on the states).
31.
See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 4–7 (existing New York law required a
New York license to operate a steamboat between New York and New Jersey).
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a federal licensing system.32 Chief Justice Marshall ruled that the
New York law was “repugnant to that clause of the constitution of
the United States, which authorizes Congress to regulate
commerce . . . according to the laws of the United States . . . .”33
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion favored a broad power of the
federal government over interstate commerce.34 This holding
“adopt[ed] a principle which acknowledge[d] the right of
Congress, over a vast scope of internal legislation, which no one
has heretofore supposed to be within its powers.”35 The Court
acknowledged situations where states could enact laws that
nevertheless would have an impact on interstate commerce, but
distinguished the police power of the state from any power to
interfere in commerce. 36 The Court’s decision included health
laws—such as quarantine laws—in the category of validly
exercised police power, but stated that if a state passed a health
law as pretext the enactments should be void.37 If “under the
pretext of executing its power, [a state] pass[es] laws for the
accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government” the
Court would have the duty of striking down the law.38 The Court
reasoned that the framers of the Constitution granted Congress
plenary authority over interstate commerce in “the conviction
that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the
tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued
relations among the Colonies and later among the States under
the Articles of Confederation.”39 Though the distinction between
state police power and state interference in interstate commerce
32.
See id. at 4–5 (outlining the New York licensing procedure and
the effect of the license on other states).
33.
Id. at 1.
34.
See Klein, supra note 9, at 24 (explaining Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion as “whittling down the role of the states in
regulating . . . interstate commerce.”).
35.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 19.
36.
See id. at 31 (explaining how a state’s police power may exist,
but it cannot be inconsistent with an act of Congress); Trevor D. Stiles,
Renewable Resources and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 4 ENVT'L & ENERGY L.
& POL'Y J. 33, 58 (2009) (explaining the dichotomy of state action created by
Chief Justice Marshall).
37.
See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 20 (explaining that quarantine laws
would be an acceptable exercise of power).
38.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 423 (1819).
39.
See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979) (describing
the intent of the Framers of the Constitution).
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may have been clear to Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons, the
Court has been required to revisit the dormant Commerce Clause
analysis in an attempt to deal with current issues.40

B. Modern Analysis
State statutes and regulations fall into three categories for
dormant Commerce Clause analysis: (1) those that are facially
discriminatory, (2) those that are facially neutral but with
discriminatory purpose or effect, and (3) those that are not
facially discriminatory but have an adverse effect on interstate
commerce.41 This Note will discuss the two main tests used in
analyzing these three categories, the virtual per se invalidity
test42 and the Pike balancing test.43 Though political
protectionism is also a facet of the application of the dormant
Commerce Clause, this Note will focus on the RMFU’s claim of
economic protectionism.44 The modern rationale of the dormant
Commerce Clause comes from the need to limit economic and
political protectionism by individual states.45 The test that is
used depends on the nature of the state statute’s interference
with interstate commerce.46 If the statute is facially neutral and
regulates evenhandedly with only incidental effects on interstate
40.
See Stiles, supra note 36, at 58 (stating that many state
actions may fall clearly under the state police power and yet still fall short of
constitutionality under disparate impact analysis).
41.
See Kathleen M. Sullivan & Noah Feldman, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, 232–33 (18th ed. 2013) (describing the three modern categories of dormant
commerce clause challenges).
42.
See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624
(1978) (“[W]here simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a
virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected.”).
43.
See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)
(introducing how to evaluate a state statute or regulation under the Pike
balancing test).
44.
See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp.
2d 1071, 1086 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (explaining how economic protectionism shapes
dormant Commerce Clause analysis).
45.
See Thomas Alcorn, The Constitutionality of California's Capand-Trade Program and Recommendations For Design of Future State
Programs, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 87, 122 (2013) (explaining the central
purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause).
46.
See Thompson, supra note 17, at 223 (explaining the
appropriate uses for each of the modern analytical tests).
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commerce, the Pike balancing test is applied.47 If the statute
discriminates against interstate commerce on its face, in practical
effect, or if its purpose is discriminatory, the virtual per se
invalidity test is applied. 48 The Supreme Court defines
discrimination in relation to the Commerce Clause as
“differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic
interest that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”49

1. Pike Balancing Test
In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., the Supreme Court
determined whether legislation enacted by the State of Arizona
violated the dormant Commerce Clause.50 Arizona’s legislation
required cantaloupes grown in Arizona to be packaged in the
state and transported in containers approved by a state official. 51
Bruce Church, Inc. had been shipping its high quality
cantaloupes across the border to a processing factory in
California, packing them with the California packaging
company’s label, and then distributing them for sale in California
and Arizona.52 Arizona brought suit against Bruce Church to
ensure that their high quality product would be labeled as coming
from Arizona thereby increasing the reputation of other farms in
Arizona.53 In order to effectuate the Arizona legislation, Bruce
Church would have to spend several months constructing a new
packing facility in Arizona, at a cost of over $200,000.54

47.
See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (describing
the approach to dormant Commerce Clause analysis under the balancing test).
48.
See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336–37 (1979)
(describing the alternative approach to the dormant Commerce Clause when a
statute is discriminatory on its face or in practical effect).
49.
Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99
(1994).
50.
See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 138 (1970)
(evaluating a state law related to selling cantaloupes outside of the state).
51.
See id. at 138 (explaining the parameters of the Arizona law).
52.
See id. at 139–40 (describing the business practices of Bruce
Church, Inc.).
53.
See id. at 142–43 (stating the local interest for the statute was
to protect the reputation of Arizona growers).
54.
See id. at 140 (describing the consequences of Bruce Church,
Inc. adhering to the Arizona statute).
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The Court looked to whether a state statute “regulates
even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and
[whether] its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental.”55 The statute “will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.”56 Justice Potter Stewart, writing for the
Court, went on to say that when a legitimate local interest is
found, the extent the interference with interstate commerce will
be tolerated is based on the nature of the interference and the
degree to which it could be advanced with less impact. 57 In his
analysis of the legitimacy of the local interest involved, Justice
Stewart found that the state’s interest in protecting the
reputation of growers in the state and the state’s interest in
maximizing financial returns to an industry within it, are
legitimate.58 As the interest was legitimate and the statute was
not facially discriminatory, there was a presumption of validity. 59
This presumption of validity was overcome by the fact that the
regulation had a “far different impact, and quite a different
purpose.”60
The Court balanced the legitimate local interest of
protecting growers reputations against requiring Bruce Church to
construct a packaging plant at a cost of $200,000 rather than
send its produce to a nearby California packaging plant, and
found that the burden imposed on commerce was excessive in
relation to its local benefits. 61 Justice Stewart stated that the
“nature of that burden is, constitutionally, more significant than
its extent.”62 Justice Stewart concluded by stating “[s]uch an
incidental consequence of a regulatory scheme could perhaps be

55.
Id. at 142 (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)).
56.
Id.
57.
Id. (discussing the extent to which a legitimate local interest
may burden interstate commerce).
58.
See id. at 143 (stating that the Arizona law did not fall under a
protected category of local regulation of a safety field).
59.
See id. (listing the requirements for a presumption of validity
of a state statute regulating produce packaging).
60.
Id. at 144.
61.
See id. (explaining the consequences of the law on the Arizona
grower).
62.
Id. at 145.
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tolerated if a more compelling state interest were involved.”63 The
balancing test established in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. is applied
to facially neutral statutes and regulations without a
discriminatory purpose or effect that place an incidental burden
on interstate commerce. 64 As explained in Part IV, Section B of
this note, the Pike balancing test is the correct test for analyzing
the California Fuel Standard.

2. Virtual Per Se Invalid Test
The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of California applied a different test to the California Fuel
Standard.65 The district court relied on Supreme Court’s rulings
that laws facially discriminating against interstate commerce are
virtually per se invalid.66 As the United States Supreme Court
has stated, “[t]he clearest example of such legislation is a law
that overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at a State's
borders.”67 In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the State of
New Jersey enacted a statute prohibiting the importation of solid
waste originating outside of the state.68 Channeling Chief Justice
Marshall’s dicta concerning the permissibility under the
Commerce Clause of “health laws,” New Jersey’s law required
that the commissioner of the State Department of Environmental
Protection clear extraterritorial waste so as not “endangering the
public health, safety and welfare.”69
63.
Id. at 146.
64.
See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp.
2d 1071, 1084–85 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (explaining when the Pike balancing test is
applied).
65.
See id. at 1090 (concluding that the Fuel Standard
“impermissibly discriminates on its face against out-of-state entities”).
66.
See id. at 1088 (explaining that laws blocking the flow of
interstate commerce are virtually per se invalid).
67.
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
68.
See id. at 618–19 (describing, briefly, the nature of the statute
in question).
69.
See id. (establishing the only permissible way for out of state
waste to be dumped in New Jersey). The Court stated that the New Jersey law
was dissimilar to the quarantine laws suggested by Chief Justice Marshall. Id.
at 629. The Court found that the laws failed to follow precedent of quarantine
laws found acceptable by the dormant Commerce Clause because the movement
of items was not banned due to evils other than the nature of the items
themselves. Id. at 628–29. (citing Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908); Reid v.
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In holding the statute invalid, the Court stated that the
statute “[o]n its face . . . impose[d] on out-of-state commercial
interests the full burden of conserving the State's remaining
landfill space.”70 The Court explained that statutes placing the
full burden on out-of-state commercial interest are virtually per
se invalid under the Commerce Clause, regardless of the initial
purpose they were enacted to serve.71 A facially invalid statute
can only be constitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause if
the state can “identify a non-protectionist and compelling local
interest that cannot be served” by any non-discriminatory
means.72 Justice Stewart found that the New Jersey statute,
though cloaked in language the Supreme Court of New Jersey
found compelling, was promulgated for a protectionist purpose. 73
The Court stated that “[c]ontrary to the evident assumption of
the state court and the parties, the evil of protectionism can
reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends.”74 Justice
Stewart concluded by stating that the purpose of the New Jersey
statute “may not be accomplished by discriminating against
articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there
is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.

Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902) and Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co.,
125 U.S. 465 (1888)).
70.
City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628.
71.
See id. at 626–27 (explaining the legislative intent of the
statute is irrelevant under the virtual per se invalid test).
72.
CAROLYN ELEFANT & EDWARD A. HOLT, CLEAN ENERGY STATES
ALLIANCE, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE RENEWABLE
PORTFOLIO
STANDARD
PROGRAMS
5
(2011),
available
at
http://www.cleanenergystates.org/resource-library/resource/cesa-report-thecommerce-clause-and-implications-for-state-renewable-portfolio-standardprograms-pdf (explaining the exception to the virtual per se invalidity test is a
narrow one) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986)
(explaining why Maine’s facially discriminatory statute is permissible under the
Commerce Clause).
73.
See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626 (finding that New
Jersey’s statute was passed for protectionist reasons); see also supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
74.
City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626.
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Both on its face and in its plain effect, [the statute] violates this
principle of nondiscrimination.” 75

C. State Success!
“Only one facially discriminatory law has avoided
invalidation . . . .”76 When California was drafting its Fuel
Standard, the only example of a facially discriminatory law that
was not held to be invalid came from Maine v. Taylor.77 In Maine
v. Taylor, the Supreme Court was called upon to determine
whether a Maine statute creating criminal liability for
individuals who brought live baitfish into the state violated the
dormant Commerce Clause.78 The state attempted to convince the
Court that a congressional act had authorized the court to lower
the level of scrutiny used to analyze the anti-live baitfish
statute.79 The Supreme Court, agreeing with the District Court of
Maine, held there was no such unambiguous authorization and
that the virtual per se invalidity test of City of Philadelphia
applied. 80 The Court therefore had to find that the statute
“serve[d] a legitimate local purpose, and the purpose [was not]
one that [could] be served as well by available nondiscriminatory
means.”81 The Supreme Court found that Maine had a legitimate
local interest in protecting the state’s “unique population of wild
fish” from the effects of baitfish parasites potentially introduced
75.
See id. at 626–27 (explaining that states cannot exclude
articles of commerce from other states unless there is a valid reason to treat
them differently).
76.
ELEFANT & HOLT, supra note 72, at 5. See generally, Maine v.
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (finding that Maine’s facially discriminatory statute is
constitutional).
77.
See id. at 5 (explaining that California only had one previous
example of success to emulate); see also, supra note 72 and accompanying text.
78.
See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137–38 (1986) (discussing
the terms of the Maine statute in question).
79.
See id. at 138–40 (arguing that the Lacey Act allows wildlife
legislation to be analyzed under a lower level of scrutiny than would otherwise
be applied under the Commerce Clause).
80.
See id. at 148 (disagreeing with the argument of Maine and
affirming the District Court of Maine in its application of the per se rule of
invalidity).
81.
See id. at 140 (discussing what the Court must find to uphold
Maine’s statute).
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by imported fish. 82 The Court also found that Maine had satisfied
the second prong of the virtual per se invalidity test by presenting
evidence that there was no legitimate non-discriminatory means
of protecting the state’s wild fish population. 83
Maine is an important marker in the development of
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence for two reasons. First,
it demonstrates the application of the virtual per se invalidity test
to a state statute protecting the environment within a state. 84
Second, it provides a guide for what constitutes an absence of
non-discriminatory means of protecting these resources.85 In
Justice John Paul Steven’s dissent in Maine, he criticized the
majority for concluding “the State has no obligation to develop
feasible inspection procedures that would make a total ban
unnecessary.”86 Thus, in drafting legislation states still must be
conscious of possible alternatives to their statutory and
regulatory schemes that place less of a burden on interstate
commerce.

III. California Fuel Standard Legislation
This part of the Note focuses on the California LowCarbon Fuel Standard (Fuel Standard) and the regulatory
scheme it created.87 The CAA expressly prohibited state
regulation of emissions from new motor vehicles. 88 Congress
provided California with latitude to create a test program “to
demonstrate the effectiveness of clean-fuel vehicles in controlling
82.
See id. at 142–43 (explaining that the parasites from the
baitfish could introduce parasites and non-native species of fish, which would
impact the state fish population unpredictably and possibly in a harmful way).
83.
See id. at 147 (finding that the “abstract possibility of
developing acceptable testing procedures” to protect the native species of fish
does not establish a “nondiscriminatory alternative”).
84.
See id. at 142–43 (following the two-step process under the per
se invalidity test for determining that the statute was valid).
85.
See id. at 147 (noting that abstract possibilities are not less
discriminatory means).
86.
See id. at 152 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87.
See generally CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95480–95490 (2010)
(creating a regulatory scheme in order to limit carbon emissions).
88.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2014) (expressly stating that states
shall not “adopt or attempt to enforce any standard regulating the control of
emissions from new motor vehicles”).
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air pollution . . . .”89 A primary requirement was that the
California program be, “in the aggregate, at least as protective of
public health and welfare as applicable Federal standards.” 90
Other states were allowed either to adopt federal standards or
the standards enacted by California.91
California’s legislature acted by pronouncing the
legitimate local interest of protecting the state’s air quality, water
supply, coastlines, and natural environment, through the
enactment of emissions regulations.92 The legislature stated that
the environmental damage would have “detrimental effects on
some of California's largest industries, including agriculture,
wine, tourism, skiing, recreational and commercial fishing and
forestry” and would “increase the strain on electricity supplies.” 93
The state legislature resolved to reduce emissions to the
equivalent of their 1990 level by the year 2020.94 The California
Air Resources Board (“CARB”) was charged with this task.95
The California legislature passed Assembly Bill 32, the
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006.96 The Act requires CARB
to “issue regulations, including scoping and reporting
requirements to achieve maximum technologically and
89.
See id. § 7589(a) (outlining the establishment of a California
pilot test program).
90.
See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070,
1078 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)) (requiring that the California
program must be stricter in terms of protecting public health than the Federal
standards).
91.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7589(f) (2014) (establishing a voluntary opt-in
program for other states interested in adopting the test program created by
California).
92.
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(a) (West 2007)
(“Global warming poses a serious threat to the economic well-being, public
health, natural resources, and the environment of California.”).
93.
See id. § 38501(b) (explaining the negative effects that global
warming has on industry and electricity supplies).
94.
See id. § 38550 (explaining that by January 1, 2008 the
California Air Resources Board (CARB) will determine the emissions level of
1990 and use that finding to determine the emissions limit equivalent to that
level, to be achieved by 2020).
95.
See id. § 38510 (placing CARB in charge of monitoring and
regulating sources of greenhouse gas in order to reduce the emission of
greenhouse gasses).
96.
See id. § 38500 (incorporating the Global Warming Solutions
Act of 2006 into the California Code); 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. 488 (West)
(enacting the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006).
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economically feasible reductions.”97 In response to this order,
CARB enacted various regulations including a cap-and-trade
program to enforce limits on carbon emissions from a variety of
domestic sources98 and regulations seeking to reduce greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions from the transportation sector.99
CARB stated that the purpose of the Fuel Standard was to
“reduce greenhouse gas emissions by reducing the full fuel-cycle,
carbon intensity of the transportation fuel pool used in California,
pursuant to the California Global Warming Solutions Act of
2006.”100 CARB would accomplish this by enacting regulations
that “appl[y] to any transportation fuel . . . that is sold, supplied,
or offered for sale in California.”101 CARB was required to
consider “the relative contribution of each source or source
category to statewide greenhouse gas emissions.”102 As the Ninth
Circuit has noted, “[i]n California, transportation emissions
account for more than 40% of GHG emissions—the state’s largest
single source.”103
To reduce transportation emissions, CARB created a three
part regulation system: (1) reducing emissions at the tailpipe
source of new vehicles,104 (2) reducing the number of vehicle miles

97.
See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070,
1079 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38561(a) and 38562
(West 2007)) (providing examples of what Assembly Bill 32 required of CARB).
98.
See CAL. CODE REGIS. tit. 17 § 95801 (2012) (introducing the
purpose of the California Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Program); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(c) (West 2007) (establishing “a system of
market-based declining annual aggregate emission limits for sources or
categories of sources that emit greenhouse gas emissions.”).
99.
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE . § 38562(a) (West 2007)
(requiring regulations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions). See also CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 13, § 1961.1 (2006) (regulating greenhouse gas exhaust emissions from
2009 through 2016 Model Passenger Cars, Light-Duty Trucks, and MediumDuty Vehicles).
100.
See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95480 (2010) (stating the
purpose of the Low-Carbon Fuel Standard).
101.
Id. § 95480.1 (noting which type of fuel the California Low
Carbon Fuel Standard regulations applied to).
102.
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38561(e) (explaining that
the state board shall take into account relative contributions of different sources
to global warming).
103.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1079
(9th Cir. 2013).
104.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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travelled,105 and (3) reducing the greenhouse gasses emitted in
the production of transportation fuels through the Fuel
Standard.106 The first two parts of the system focus on demand
through the sale of new vehicles and the use of vehicles by
consumers.107 “The Fuel Standard . . . is directed at the supply
side, creating an alternate path to emissions reduction by
reducing the carbon intensity of transportation fuels that are
burned in California.”108
The problem with supply side regulation of greenhouse
gas emissions is the location of the supply. California’s fuel
standard regulates fuels that are sold or imported into
California. 109 Because of it’s insufficient in-state supply of
feedstock—raw materials used to make alternative fuels like
corn, sugar cane, or oil—California is forced to regulate activity
outside of the state.110 California does so not by reaching outside
of the state but regulating the fuel, or fuel stocks, as they enter
the state to be consumed or created into alternative fuels. 111 This
is where the dormant Commerce Clause challenge originates.
The foundation of the Fuel Standard’s regulation of carbon
emissions is the focus on the lifecycle measurement of carbon
intensity.112 Carbon intensity is “the amount of lifecycle
105.
See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65080 (West 2011) (directing
transportation planning agencies to create a sustainable communities strategies
implementing the goals of emissions reductions proposed by CARB including the
recording of vehicle miles travelled).
106.
See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95480–95490 (establishing the
California Fuel Standard).
107.
See Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1079 (“The Tailpipe and VMT
[vehicle miles travelled] standards work on the demand side; they aim to lower
the consumption of GHG-generating transportation fuels.”).
108.
Id. at 1079–80.
109.
See CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 17 § 95480.1 (2010) (stating that the
Fuel Standard “applies to any transportation fuel . . . that is sold, supplied, or
offered for sale in California”).
110.
See Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1082–83 (explaining how
California evaluated feedstocks from the Midwest and Brazil, in addition to instate feedstock, with the Fuel Standard).
111.
See id. at 1080 (explaining that California’s Fuel Standard
regulates the supply side by requiring fuel blenders to keep the average carbon
intensity of its total volume of fuel below a certain level).
112.
See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95482–95483 (2010)
(establishing the average carbon intensity requirements for gasoline, diesel, and
alternative fuels).
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greenhouse gas emissions, per unit of energy of fuel delivered,
expressed in grams of carbon dioxide equivalent per mega joule
(gCO2E/MJ).”113 Under the Fuel Standard carbon intensity is
measured throughout the lifecycle of the fuel.114 “Lifecycle
greenhouse gas emissions” are defined as:
[T]he aggregate quantity of greenhouse gas
emissions . . . related to the full fuel lifecycle,
including all stages of fuel and feedstock
production and distribution, from feedstock
generation or extraction through the distribution
and delivery and use of the finished fuel to the
ultimate consumer, where the mass values for all
greenhouse gases are adjusted to account for their
relative global warming potential.115
The Fuel Standard established a declining annual cap on
average carbon intensity starting in 2011 and culminating in a
10% decrease by 2020.116 Fuel producers are required to remain
below the cap requirements for each year.117 Credits and deficits
are created for amounts producers are above or below the cap. 118
“Credits can be used to offset deficits, may be sold to other
blenders, or may be carried forward to comply with the carbon
intensity cap in later years.”119 Credits are generated quarterly 120

113.
Id. at § 95481(16).
114.
See id. (defining carbon intensity).
115.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95481(a)(38) (2010).
116.
See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95482(b) (2010) (delineating the
required reduction in average carbon intensity for gasoline and gasoline
substitutes from 2011 to 2020); Cal. Exec. Order No. S-01-07 (Jan. 1, 2007),
available at www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/eos0107.pdf (ordering “that a statewide
goal be established to reduce the carbon intensity of California’s transportation
fuels by at least 10 percent by 2020”).
117.
See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95482(a) (2010) (describing the
expectations of fuel producers).
118.
See id. at § 95485(a) (supplying the formula used for producers
to calculate credits and deficits).
119.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1080
(9th Cir. 2013) (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95485 (2010)).
120.
See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95485(b) (2010) (establishing
that beginning in 2011 credits are generated quarterly).
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and may be bought and sold like commodities in the market
established by the Fuel Standard.121
One of the main issues with creating a standard to
regulate transportation fuels in a state is that for the regulation
to be effective the state legislature must do one of two things: (1)
require that all fuels be produced inside the state (something that
is both constitutionally impossible under the Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and practically impossible due to demand,
facilities, and resources required),122 or (2) impose carbon
emission requirements on transportation fuels that are imported
into the state.123 The Fuel Standard attempts the second method
by utilizing the lifecycle analysis of carbon emissions. 124 Through
the lifecycle analysis CARB determines the carbon emissions for
every step that goes into producing a fuel from the blendstock. 125
Individual iterations of a lifecycle, called a pathway, are assigned
a carbon intensity value.126 These pathways are used to
determine the carbon intensity value of the production of a
particular type of fuel. 127 In order to have producers participate in
the Fuel Standard marketplace, where credits for carbon
intensity are traded, fuels must be compared based on the totality
of the carbon emissions of their production. 128
In order to compare the lifecycle emissions of fuel
produced from a variety of blendstocks, California utilized the
121.
See id. at § 95485(c) (explaining the Fuel Standard market and
how it can used by producers).
122.
See supra Part B (addressing modern constitutional analysis of
the dormant Commerce Clause).
123.
See Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1081 (“[T]he climate-change
benefits of biofuels such as ethanol, which mostly come before combustion,
would be ignored if CARB's regulatory focus were limited to emissions produced
when fuels are consumed in California.”).
124.
See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95481(a)(38) (2010) (defining
lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions).
125.
See id. (including every step of the fuel creation process in the
definition of lifecycle analysis); see also id. at § 95481(a)(14) (defining blendstock
as a component that is either used as a fuel or is combined with other
components to create a fuel used in a motor vehicle).
126.
See id. § 95481(a)(14) (explaining that each blendstock
corresponds to a pathway).
127.
See id. § 95481(a)(16) (defining carbon intensity).
128.
See Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1081 (“An accurate
comparison is possible only when it is based on the entire lifecycle emissions of
each fuel pathway”).
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Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in
Transportation Model (GREET).129 California modified the
GREET Model, now aptly named CA-GREET, to incorporate
“detailed information about local conditions, including
California's stringent environmental regulations and low-carbon
electricity supply.”130 Fuel producers are given three ways to
comply with the reporting requirements of the Fuel Standard.131
Method 1 involves utilizing the default pathways issued by
CARB.132 Fuel producers are able to rely on Table 6 provided in
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 95486(b)(1) to determine the average
value of carbon intensity for the creation of gasoline or gasoline
alternatives.133 Method 2A allows a fuel producer to propose
modifications to one or more inputs of the CA-GREET Model or
modifications to one or more inputs to an alternative model used
to generate a new pathway.134 The fuel producer must show “that
the proposed Method 2A . . . is at least 5.00 grams CO2-eq/MJ
less than . . . calculated under Method 1 . . . [and that the
producer] can and expects to provide in California more than 10
million gasoline gallon equivalents per year.”135 Method 2B allows
for even more customization by the fuel producer, allowing
creation of a new pathway provided that it is not already listed in
the default pathways issue and that it is scientifically
defensible. 136

129.
See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95481(b)(14) (2010) (explaining
the acronym GREET).
130.
See Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1082 (discussing how CAGREET works).
131.
See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95486 (2010) (establishing the
different methods available to fuel producers to determine carbon intensity
values).
132.
See id. § 95486(b)(1) (stating that to determine carbon
intensity values under Method 1 the default pathways created by CARB,
through utilization of the CA-GREET data, are used).
133.
See id. at § 95486(b) (displaying the relevant data in Table 6).
134.
See id. § 95486(c) (providing an alternative to Method 1 by
allowing customization of the pathway determination via Method 2A).
135.
See id. § 95486(e)(2)(A)–(B) (stating the requirements for a
proposed Method 2A to be approved).
136.
See id. § 95486(d) (allowing for the creation of a new pathway
under Method 2B and listing what is required to create a new pathway).

DR. CARB

359

Location plays a major role in the determination of carbon
intensity.137 In a Ninth Circuit opinion, Judge Ronald Gould
discussed the relevant example of ethanol produced through
fermentation of feedstock.138 The opinion stated that under CAGREET the ethanol’s carbon intensity is determined by
considering:
(1) growth and transportation of the feedstock, with
a credit for the GHGs absorbed during
photosynthesis; (2) efficiency of production; (3) type
of electricity used to power the plant; (4) fuel used
for thermal energy; (5) milling process used; (6)
offsetting value of an animal-feed co-product called
distillers' grains, that displaces demand for feed
that would generate its own emissions in
production; (7) transportation of the fuel to the
blender in California; and (8) conversion of land to
agricultural use.139
Under this analysis, “[f]actors related to transportation,
efficiency, and electricity are correlated with a plant’s location in
the Midwest, Brazil, or California.”140 Judge Gould emphasizes
the importance of location in the CA-GREET factors by stating
that the California production facilities are newer and more
efficient so they receive a discount under the model.141 California
is hurt, however, by the fact that there is no corn grown for
ethanol in the state.142 This forces producers in California to

137.
See id. § 95486(b) (establishing different default carbon
intensity ratings in Table 6 depending on the location of the production facility).
138.
See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070,
1082–84 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing the treatment of ethanol under the CAGREET Model).
139.
Id. at 1083.
140.
See id. (describing the location analysis for determining the
carbon intensity values for a pathway).
141.
See id. (explaining the intricacies of carbon intensity analysis
under CA-GREET)
142.
See id. (explaining that California ethanol producers have to
import raw corn for ethanol).
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expend carbon importing the fuel stock.143 The Midwest and
Brazil have domestic corn production and, therefore, fare better
in that respect.144
After this “big picture” overview of California’s Low
Carbon Fuel Standard this Note will focus on the challenge to the
legislation made by the Rocky Mountain Farmer’s Union. 145

IV. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union
The Rocky Mountain Farmers Union (RMFU) is a
“progressive, grassroots organization founded in 1907” to
represent family farmers in Wyoming, Colorado, and New
Mexico.146 Its goal is sustaining rural communities, wise
stewardship and use of natural resources, and protection of the
region’s food supply.147

A. District Court
In December 2009, RMFU (along with several other
organizational plaintiffs) brought suit against James Goldstene,
then Executive Officer of CARB, in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of California asking for declaratory
and injunctive relief against CARB for the imposition of the Fuel
Standard.148
143.
See id. (stating that raw corn imported for ethanol is heavier,
and therefore more carbon intensive than finished fuel product coming from the
Midwest and Brazil).
144.
See id. (explaining that, based on CA-GREET pathways, the
Midwest expends the least amount of carbon transporting fuel).
145.
See generally Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730
F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F.
Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
146.
See About Us, ROCKY MOUNTAIN FARMERS UNION,
http://www.rmfu.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2014, 7:30 PM) (describing the
history of the Rocky Mountain Farmers Union) (on file with the WASHINGTON
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
147.
See id. (“RMFU is dedicated to sustaining our rural
communities, to wise stewardship and use of natural resources, and to
protection of our safe, secure food supply.”).
148.
See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp.
2d 1071, 1078–79 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (explaining the nature of the suit against
CARB); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 19–20, Rocky
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1. RMFU’s Arguments
RMFU moved for declaratory judgment and an order
enjoining enforcement of the fuel standard.149 RMFU was
concerned that the Fuel Standard would “effectively bar Midwestproduced ethanol from the California market.”150 Other groups
joined the RMFU in their concern over the constitutionality of the
Fuel Standard stating that, if allowed to stand, the law would
“give other states permission to defy the intent of Congress”
thereby allowing the “establish[ment of] a patchwork of fuel
regulations that would greatly complicate the nation's fuel
infrastructure and potentially limit the trade of fuel and fuel
components between states.”151 In RMFU’s motion for summary
judgment, they argued that the fuel standard violated the
dormant Commerce Clause and was preempted by federal law.152
RMFU advanced its dormant Commerce Clause claim by
stating that the California Fuel Standard discriminated against
Midwest corn ethanol producers and importers by “assigning
them relatively higher total carbon intensity values vis-a-vis
California corn ethanol producers.” 153 RMFU asserts the Fuel
Standard assigns these values even though the California
producers utilize “substantially the same production methods to
produce substantially the same product.”154 RMFU asserted that
Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
(No. 1:09-cv-02234), 2009 WL 5421971 (stating prayer for relief and filing date).
149.
See id. at 1078 (explaining the procedural history of the court’s
opinion).
150.
Ethanol Producers Sue Over California's Low-Carbon Rule, 30
No. 14 ANDREWS ENVTL. LITIG. REP. 6, Feb. 3, 2010, at 1 [hereinafter Ethanol
Producers Sue] (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); see also Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, supra note 148, at 12 (explaining the effects and the
consequences of the Fuel Standard).
151.
See Ethanol Producers Sue, supra note 150, at 2 (quoting the
joint statement of Growth Energy and the Renewable Fuels Association).
152.
See Rocky Mountain, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1078 (briefly outlining
the plaintiffs arguments). RMFU’s preemption argument is beyond the scope of
this note.
153.
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra
note 148, at ¶¶ 78–91 (outlining how the Fuel Standard violates the dormant
Commerce Clause).
154.
Id. at ¶ 81.
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California has effectively “erected a barrier to Midwest corn
ethanol around its borders.”155
According to the RMFU, California impermissibly
regulated and interfered with the channels of interstate
commerce through subjecting out-of-state producers to higher instate burdens due solely to their location. 156 RMFU claimed the
interference is unconstitutional because the Fuel Standard ties
higher carbon intensity values to the out-of-state producers
interstate shipping decisions.157 RMFU argued the Fuel Standard
facially discriminated against interstate commerce by requiring
approval of interstate shipping, delivery, and distribution
methods before out-of-state producers could generate credits. 158
In an effort to bolster its argument the RMFU included a claim
that the Fuel Standard also discriminated in practical effect. 159
The facially discriminatory and the practical effect
arguments place the Fuel Standard under the purview of City of
Philadelphia’s virtually per se invalid test.160 RMFU emphasized
the applicability of the virtually per se invalid test by stating that
“[t]he burden of the [Fuel Standard] on interstate commerce in
corn ethanol is clearly excessive in relation to any purported local
benefits.”161 The Fuel Standard would “not result in any
measurable global climate change, nor in any measurable
reduction of the effects of global warming. California's share of
those immeasurable changes and reductions is likewise
immeasurable, meaning the [Fuel Standard] provides no local
benefit to the state.”162 RMFU also argued the Fuel Standard
amounted to economic protectionism through its goal of replacing
155.
Id.
156.
See id. at ¶82 (stating that California interferes with the
channels of interstate commerce by imposing a higher burden on out-of-state
producers merely because they ship into California).
157.
See id. (explaining the connection between California’s action
and the interstate commerce of the RMFU).
158.
See id. at ¶ 83 (arguing that the imposition of requirements on
shipping methods facially discriminates against interstate commerce).
159.
See id. at ¶ 84 (stating that the Fuel Standard, actually and
practically, regulates wholly outside of California).
160.
See supra Part II.B.2 (describing the virtually per se invalid
test).
161.
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note
148, at ¶86.
162.
Id.
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imported fuel-stocks with those produced in state, thereby
keeping more money in the state.163
RMFU in its motion for summary judgment requested the
court grant relief in the form of a declaratory judgment that the
Fuel Standard violates federal law and permanent and
preliminary injunctions against California enforcing the Fuel
Standard.164

2. CARB’s Arguments
CARB responded to the RMFU’s motion for declaratory
judgment by arguing the RMFU had not carried their burden in
showing the Fuel Standard discriminated against interstate
commerce.165 CARB began by showing that the lifecycle analysis
employed by the Fuel Standard is internationally recognized as
the method for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.166 CARB also
attempted to counter the argument that the Fuel Standard
assigns lower carbon intensity ratings to California producers of
ethanol by pointing out that the CA-GREET model did not assign
California the lowest value for any ethanol type. 167 CARB
concluded their rebuttal of the facial discrimination claim by
explaining the inclusion of the 2A and 2B methods of carbon
intensity rating.168

163.
See id. at ¶ 85 (explaining that CARB expects a decreased in
Midwest imported ethanol while California ethanol production remains
constant).
164.
See id. at 19–20 (requesting the district court take the listed
actions).
165.
See Defendants And Defendant-interveners’ Supplemental
Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Opposition To RMFU’s Motion For
Summary Judgment at 6–7, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843
F. Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 1:09-CV-02234-LJO-DLB) 2011 WL
1233984 [hereinafter Defendant’s Response] (stating that the party challenging
the statue has the burden of showing discrimination and that the RMFU had
not carried that burden).
166.
See id. at 7 (explaining that two of the other plaintiffs (RFA
and Growth Energy) in the case acknowledge the efficacy of lifecycle analysis).
167.
See id. at 8 (stating that out-of-state producers of cane ethanol
receive a better rating than California producers).
168.
See id. at 9 (describing the alternative carbon intensity
valuation methods provided for in the Fuel Standard).
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CARB also argued that RMFU had failed to show evidence
that the Fuel Standard actually had a discriminatory effect on
Midwest ethanol.169 Midwest ethanol plants continue to be built
and existing plants continue to be purchased.170 CARB also
produced evidence that Midwest ethanol was selling in
California. 171 CARB demonstrated that ethanol from the Midwest
was being sold in California for more than it would have in other
western United States markets.172 Evidence was presented that
Midwest producers were achieving lower carbon intensity ratings
than California producers. 173
CARB concluded its rebuttal to RMFU’s dormant
Commerce Clause claim by arguing that the Fuel Standard
places no burden on interstate commerce and therefore was
subject to Pike Balancing.174 In the alternative, CARB argued
even if the Fuel Standard was subject to strict scrutiny it
survives because it serves a compelling state interest and cannot
be achieved by any non-discriminatory means.175

3. The District Court’s Ruling
On December 29, 2011 the district court granted RMFU’s
request for preliminary injunction and entered judgment for

169.
See id. at 11 (stating that the crucial inquiry is whether or not
market share of out-of-state producers is reduced and that the plaintiffs have
produced no evidence to prove this).
170.
See id. at 13 (explaining that the Fuel Standard has not killed
the ethanol production market in the Midwest).
171.
See id. at 14 (showing that Midwest ethanol had two registered
carbon intensities for sale in California).
172.
See id. at 15 (stating that Midwest ethanol was sold for a
higher price than it would be sold in Phoenix or the Pacific Northwest).
173.
See id. (explaining that five current and twenty future
Midwest producers had carbon intensity ratings lower than California
producers).
174.
See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp.
2d 1071, 1085 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (presenting CARB’s argument that strict
scrutiny analysis should not apply because the Fuel Standard is “a neutral law
that applies evenly”).
175.
See Defendant’s Response, supra note 165, at 16 (arguing that
California is not closed to Midwest ethanol and that the lifecycle analysis is the
only effective method available to the state in combating greenhouse gasses).
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RMFU against CARB on RMFU’s dormant Commerce Claim. 176
The court did so on two grounds: (1) the court held the Fuel
Standard regulations discriminate against out-of-state energy
producers, and (2) the court held that California attempted to
regulate activities outside of its borders.177
The district court ruled that because the CAA did not give
express or unambiguous authority for California to violate the
Commerce Clause, the Fuel Standard did not survive Commerce
Clause scrutiny.178 The court then analyzed the extent to which
the fuel standard discriminated against interstate commerce.179
Focusing on the tables the statute used to provide the
default pathways for different blendstocks from varying
regions,180 the court found that, when the same production
processes and blendstocks were used, the Fuel Standard
“assign[ed] a higher [carbon intensity] on the basis of origin
alone.”181 The court dismissed CARB’s argument that the figures
used for the default pathways were based on scientific methods
rather than location.182 The court stated that there were
“favorable assumptions [for] California” in the figures used for
the carbon intensity calculation and concluded “[t]his
discriminates against interstate commerce.”183 The court also
decided that, “tying carbon intensity scores to the distance a good
travels in interstate commerce discriminates against interstate
commerce.”184 Furthermore, the court dismissed the argument
that the differences in the methods available to producers to
176.
See Rocky Mountain, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1105 (issuing orders in
the case).
177.
See Klass, supra note 12, at 197 (explaining the ruling of the
District Court).
178.
See Rocky Mountain, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1084 (determining
that the Fuel Standard was subject to scrutiny under the Commerce Clause).
179.
See id. at 1085–90 (analyzing the impact of the fuel standard
on interstate commerce).
180.
See id. at 1087 (stating that the Table 6 “explicitly
differentiate[s] among ethanol pathways based on origin.”); see also Cal. Code
Regs. tit. 17, § 95486(b)(1) (2010) (displaying Table 6 and its relevant data).
181.
See Rocky Mountain, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1087 (evaluating the
Fuel Standard’s assessment of in-state and out-of-state ethanol pathways).
182.
See id. at 1087–88 (outlining the arguments of CARB against
the Commerce Clause challenges to the default pathways).
183.
See id. at 1088 (explaining why the Fuel Standard “offends the
Commerce Clause).
184.
Id.
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determine the carbon intensity of their product did not allow the
statute to survive the Commerce Clause.185 The potential for
producers to define new pathways to determine carbon intensity
was at the sole discretion of CARB and therefore it was “no
defense to describe methods that might allow amendment of the
LCFS in a manner that might ameliorate the discriminatory
impact of the regulation.”186
Ultimately, the court’s analysis of the Fuel Standard did
not fully grasp the approach of CARB in assigning values for
carbon intensity. By focusing on the methods and materials used
to produce ethanol, CARB successfully avoided the issue of
location. If CARB assigned carbon intensity values solely based
on the region the ethanol originated from, then the district court’s
analysis would have been correct.
Instead, the court unjustifiably allowed regulation of
conduct outside of the state’s borders. 187 The Fuel Standard
incentivized certain methods of production in an attempt to
change the behavior of entities wholly outside the state.188 The
court also determined that the Fuel Standard “impermissibly
regulates the channels of interstate commerce.”189 The court
found that this type of regulation, replicated by various states,
would result in the Balkanization of the ethanol market.190
The court held the statute facially discriminates against
interstate commerce and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny

185.
See id. at 1089 (“Moreover, the Method 2A and Method 2B
procedures in the [Fuel Standard] do not alter this Court’s conclusion that the
[Fuel Standard] discriminates on its face against out-of-state corn ethanol.”).
186.
Id. at 1089–90 (emphasis in original).
187.
See id. at 1090–93 (delineating RMFU’s argument for
impermissible control of activities beyond California’s border); see generally
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1978) (establishing control beyond a state’s
borders as an impermissible exercise of state power under the Commerce
Clause).
188.
See Rocky Mountain, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1091 (describing the
practical effect of the regulation as controlling conduct wholly outside of
California).
189.
See id. at 1092 (explaining that the Fuel Standard could
influence the decision of a producer to use rail instead of a truck or a ship to
transport materials).
190.
See id. (stating that the Fuel Standard would influence
producers to only sell to certain markets to avoid transportation or other
penalties).
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analysis.191 The district court proceeded to apply the virtual per
se invalidity test, asking whether the fuel standard served a
legitimate local purpose and whether California lacked a nondiscriminatory alternative.192 The court noted that, under
Massachusetts v. EPA, “that a state has a local and legitimate
interest in reducing global warming.”193 It then cautioned that
though the purpose of the legislation was “legitimate,” it cannot
“be achieved by the illegitimate means of isolating the State from
the national economy.”194 The court held that CARB failed to
carry the burden in showing there were no nondiscriminatory
alternatives to the fuel standard. 195 The court stated that though
the alternatives “may be less desirable, for a number of reasons,
[CARB has] failed to establish there are no nondiscriminatory
means by which California could serve its purpose of combating
global warming through the reduction of GHG emissions.” 196
The district court concluded by finding for RMFU and
stating that California’s Fuel Standard “impermissibly treads
into the province and powers of our federal government, reaches
beyond its boundaries to regulate activity wholly outside of its
borders, and offends the dormant Commerce Clause.”197

B. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
In reviewing the appeal of the CARB, the Ninth Circuit
reviewed the grant of summary judgment under a de novo
standard198 and the grant of preliminary injunction under an
191.
See id. at 1089 (determining the level of scrutiny to be applied
to the statute).
192.
See id. at 1093 (presenting the constitutional test required
when a statute facially discriminates against interstate commerce).
193.
Id. (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519, 522
(2007)).
194.
Id. at 1088–89 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)).
195.
See id. at 1093–94 (stating that the court was not convinced by
California’s arguments “that the goal of reducing global warming cannot be
adequately served by nondiscriminatory alternatives”).
196.
Id. at 1094.
197.
Id.
198.
See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070,
1086–87 (9th Cir. 2013) (determining the standard of review for appeals of
summary judgment grants); see also CRM Collateral II, Inc. v. TriCounty Metro.
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abuse of discretion standard.199 The Ninth Circuit reversed the
decision of the district court by holding that the Fuel Standard
was not facially discriminatory and therefore the trial court failed
to apply the correct test in analyzing the statute.200
The Ninth Circuit first determined the district court erred
in its analysis of the CA-GREET pathways.201 Rather than
focusing on the pathways themselves for comparison, the court
instead focused on the end product.202 The court found that,
regardless of the production method, ethanol was end product. 203
Furthermore, the appeals court held that the district court
erroneously excluded pathways from their analysis. 204 In fact, the
district court excluded sugar cane ethanol, predominantly from
Brazil, and “all GHG emissions related to transportation,
electricity, and plant efficiency from comparison,” before
concluding that the fuel standard is facially discriminatory on the
basis of origin. 205 The final product of ethanol is truly fungible
and has “identical physical and chemical properties” regardless of
Transp. Dist. of Or., 669 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir.2012) (establishing the standard
of review for summary judgment motions as de novo); Black Star Farms LLC v.
Oliver, 600 F.3d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir. 2010) (establishing that review of a district
court’s resolution of constitutional claims is de novo).
199.
See Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1087 (determining the
standard of review for appeals of preliminary injunction grants); see also
Stormans Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1119 (9th Cir.2009) (establishing
review of preliminary injunction grants as under an abuse of discretion
standard).
200.
See Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1078 (“We hold that the Fuel
Standard’s regulation of ethanol does not facially discriminate against out-ofstate commerce, and its initial crude oil provisions . . . did not discriminate
against out-of-state crude oil in purpose or practical effect.”).
201.
See id. at 1088 (criticizing the district court’s use of “selective
comparison” in evaluating fuel pathways).
202.
See id. at 1089 (“If we ignore these real differences between
ethanol pathways, we cannot understand whether the challenged regulation
responds to genuine threats of harm or to the mere out-of-state status of an
ethanol pathway. All factors that affect carbon intensity are critical to
determining whether the Fuel Standard gives equal treatment to similarly
situated fuels.”).
203.
See id. at 1090 (explaining that “CARB’s method of lifecycle
analysis treats ethanol the same regardless of origin”).
204.
See id. at 1088 (finding that the district court excluded
relevant fuel pathways and contributors to GHG emissions).
205.
See id. (highlighting the faults in the district court’s evaluation
as to whether the Fuel Standard is facially discriminatory).
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the production methods.206 Therefore the district court erred in
leaving Brazilian ethanol out of its analysis. 207 Additionally,
“[t]he district court also erred by ignoring GHG emissions related
to: (1) the electricity used to power the conversion process, (2) the
efficiency of the ethanol plant, and (3) the transportation of the
feedstock, ethanol, and co-products.”208
The elimination of these factors from the district court’s
analysis is important because it removes the scientific validity of
the assignment of carbon intensity values. Selectively analyzing
factors of the statutory scheme allowed the district court to focus
on the factors colored by origin, an analysis that would result in a
determination that the factors were facially discriminatory
against producers outside of California. This was an error by the
district court even if the data was correlated with location.209 As
the Ninth Circuit noted, “[a]ll factors that affect carbon intensity
are critical to determining whether the Fuel Standard gives equal
treatment to similarly situated fuels.”210
The Ninth Circuit also reversed the district court’s holding
that California impermissibly regulated beyond its borders.211
The Ninth Circuit found that California could assign different
values of carbon intensity to ethanol from different regions as
long as its rationale is not solely based on origin.212 This is
because California does not “base its treatment on a fuel's origin
but on its carbon intensity.”213 The Fuel Standard only uses
“location but only to the extent that location affects the actual
GHG emissions attributable to a default pathway.”214
206.
See id. (explaining why the comparisons made need to be
different from the district court’s).
207.
See id. (finding error in the district court’s exclusion of
Brazilian ethanol data).
208.
Id.
209.
See id. (stating the district court erroneously compared data
without concern for the emissions created by the three ignored factors).
210.
Id. at 1089; see also, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 524
(2007) (arguing that even an incremental step to reduce emissions is important
to the Court’s analysis).
211.
See Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1101 (disagreeing with the
district court that the Fuel Standard regulates extraterritorial conduct).
212.
See id. at 1089 (“[A] regulation is not facially discriminatory
simply because it affects in-state and out-of-state interests unequally,” and
different treatment must mean there are other reasons other than origin).
213.
Id.
214.
Id.
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The Ninth Circuit reiterated that producers could apply
for an individual determination of fuel intensity if they qualified
under Method 2A or 2B.215 The Court found that California
producers did not have a leg up in the individual pathway
application process. 216 Indeed, each individual producer was
required to apply for, and have approved, his or her own
individual pathway.217 The Court found that the burden and
benefits to certain producers “are attributable to the imprecision
of averages rather than to discrimination,” and concluded that
“CARB gives ethanol producers in each regional category the
substantially evenhanded treatment demanded by the Commerce
Clause.”218
The Ninth Circuit concluded CARB’s decision to create a
regional category based on California’s border was not facially
discriminatory.219 Though the Fuel Standard's categories were
formed with reference to state boundaries, they treated ethanol
from all sources evenhandedly showing a rationale apart from
origin.220 The court explained that as of June 2011 there were no
producers of corn ethanol in states neighboring California and
that isolation provided legitimate justification for establishing
California as one of the regional boundaries.221 “CARB's decision
to align the regional categories as it did produced accurate carbon
intensity values.”222 In addition, regional energy supplies also
provided adequate justification for the regions created by
215.
See id. at 1093–94 (explaining that the system is designed to
avoid costly individualized determinations but that the alternative methods
allow producers who are burdened by the default pathway to get an
individualized assessment).
216.
See id. at 1094 (“Parties from all three regions have registered
individualized pathways showing that the categories do not uniformly benefit
California’s producers.”).
217.
See id. (explaining that a producer could not rely on the grant
of a pathway to another producer).
218.
Id. (citations omitted).
219.
See id. (determining use of the California border was not
facially discriminatory).
220.
See id. at 1096 (“The Fuel Standard’s regional categories for
the default pathways show every sign that they were chose to accurately
measure and control GHGs and were not an attempt to protect California
ethanol producers.”).
221.
See id. (explaining that the closest producer was in Idaho,
while the rest were East of the Rocky Mountains or in Brazil).
222.
Id.
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CARB.223 CARB utilizes the regional categories to make the
default pathways more efficient and accurate for the regulated
parties, and on top of this CARB provides a method for
individualized pathways if the producers feel the default’s do not
accurately reflect the carbon intensity of their methods.224
This holding is extremely important for states seeking to
draft emissions regulations. Utilization of regional categories can
be an integral part of a regulatory scheme’s ability to withstand
dormant Commerce Clause challenges, especially when combined
with an individual determination method similar to the one used
in the Fuel Standard. Basing valuations on region rather than by
state can diminish the argument that a state is restricting
interstate commerce. This is specifically when sources of
emissions, methods of production, or resources, are starkly
divided by region.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court
determination that the fuel standard impermissibly regulates
conduct beyond the state’s borders.225 The Ninth Circuit held that
the fuel standard only regulated the California market.226 The
statute did not “make [an] effort to ensure the price of ethanol is
lower in California than in other states, and it imposes no civil or
criminal penalties on non-compliant transactions completed
wholly out of state.”227 The CA-GREET factors measure and
consider numerous factors that exist outside of the state of
California, “[b]ut California does not control these factors—
directly or in practical effect—simply because it factors them into
the lifecycle analysis.”228
Because the Ninth Circuit found that the district court
erred in its application of strict scrutiny to the Fuel Standard, the
court remanded the case back to the district court.229 The district
court will be required to apply the Pike balancing test to
223.
See id. (explaining the differences in regional energy sources).
224.
See id. at 1096 (explaining the utility of the different methods
provided by the Fuel Standard).
225.
See id. at 1101 (“[N]o jurisdiction need adopt a particular
regulatory standard for its producers to gain access to California.”).
226.
See id. (dismissing the rationale of the district court).
227.
Id. at 1103.
228.
Id.
229.
See id. at 1107 (noting that “[t]he Fuel Standard’s ethanol
provisions are not facially discriminatory”).
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determine if the Fuel Standard places a burden on interstate
commerce that is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits.230

V. Drafting Future Legislation
The Center for Climate and Energy Solutions has opined
that “[t]wo trends are apparent with regard to state and regional
efforts that address climate change: 1) more states are taking
action and 2) they are adopting more types of policies.” 231 As of
March 2011, twenty-nine states have renewable portfolio
standards.232 For these standards to be functional and long
lasting they have to be drafted with the intent of surviving
Commerce Clause challenges from out-of-state producers, or even
neighboring states.233 Utilizing the RMFU decision and other
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, this Note will now
address some options for drafters of new environmental
legislation or revisions to existing legislation.

A. Acceptable Aims of Energy Regulation
Absent involvement from Congress, states that wish to be
environmentally conscious will be required to take matters into
their own hands.234 If a state seeks to address environmental
regulation, their first consideration is establishing a permissible
aim to the legislation.235 States should be prepared for their
statutory or regulatory schemes to be attacked under the virtual
230.
See id. (explaining how the district court should apply the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling on remand).
231.
CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, CLIMATE CHANGE
101: STATE ACTION 1, available at www.c2es.org/docUploads/climate-101state.pdf.
232.
See ELEFANT, supra note 72, at 3 (explaining the expansion of
states utilizing renewable portfolio standards to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions).
233.
See id. at 4 (outlining considerations states should make in
creating RPS).
234.
See Kunkleman, supra note 22 (quoting Lee C. Paddock in
saying that “state initiatives are the ‘direct result of inaction by Congress’”).
235.
See ELEFANT, supra note 72, at 15 (stating that even when a
facially neutral statute impacts interstate commerce the courts will require that
the legitimate goals outweigh the incidental burden).
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per se invalidity test and the Pike’s balancing test.236 Therefore
states must ensure there is a developed legislative history of a
compelling state interest in regulating emissions. 237 In the
development of the statutes states should highlight findings of
commissions and committees that support the regulation of
emissions. The development of a compelling state interest will
ensure that the state interest prongs of both tests will be
satisfied. States should also include language in the purpose or
goals section of environmental legislation emphasizing their
desire to reduce emissions, though the impact of their state’s
efforts might be negligible on a global scale.238

B. Regulatory Structures
A stated legitimate purpose will not shield legislation that
is facially discriminatory from a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge.239 This section of the Note provides recommendations
for drafting regulatory schemes to avoid dormant Commerce
Clause challenges, first advising on the content of the regulatory
scheme and second proposing alternative methods of regulation.
The first suggested method of drafting a regulatory
scheme aimed at reducing emissions is to include relevant data
inputs that are not simply based on origin.240 Ensuring that the
data points are truly based on the creation of emissions and not

236.
See id. at 5–9 (highlighting the Commerce Clause tests that
can be applied to a RPS).
237.
See id. at 5–6 (emphasizing the importance of a compelling
local interest when evaluating whether a RPS stands under the virtual per se
invalidity test or the Pike balancing test).
238.
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007) (“That
these climate-change risks are ‘widely shared’ does not minimize Massachusetts'
interest in the outcome of this litigation.”).
239.
See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626
(1978) (“Contrary to the evident assumption of the state court and the parties,
the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative
ends.”).
240.
See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070,
1088 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating the district court found the ethanol pathways
discriminated based on origin).
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simply based on the origin of the product is crucial. 241 This is
demonstrated in the default pathways that were established
under the California fuel standard.242 CARB ensured that the
data points that were being used to measure emissions during
the life cycle of each fuel were only related to location where that
was a factor in the emission of carbon.243 If pathways are created
based simply on the location of origin of the fuel they will be
categorized as facially discriminatory and will be challenged as
unconstitutional.244 This method of focusing legislative efforts on
the specifics of the emissions sources being regulated can be
applied to legislation that aims to regulate other environmental
harms in a way that mitigates the effectiveness of dormant
Commerce Clause challenges.245
The California Fuel Standard was also designed to avoid
dormant Commerce Clause challenges through its allowance for
individual determinations of pathways.246 Through the creation of
three different pathways for producers to opt-in to, California
allowed for out-of-state producers to submit their own production
processes for carbon intensity analysis.247 Though on its own a
provision such as this might not create a shield for dormant
Commerce Clause liability, it would reduce the potential for
challenges from out-of-state producers that utilized production

241.
See id. at 1090 (approving of CARB’s method of lifecycle
analysis because it treats “ethanol analysis the same regardless of origin” and
focuses on the carbon intensity of an ethanol pathway).
242.
See id. at 1089 (“All factors that affect carbon intensity are
critical to determining whether the Fuel Standard gives equal treatment to
similarly situated fuels.”).
243.
See id. (stating that location was only considered only to the
extent that it affected actual greenhouse gas emissions).
244.
See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp.
2d 1071, 1088 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (stating that a facially discriminatory statute is
unconstitutional).
245.
See ELEFANT, supra note 72, at 14–18 (giving recommendations
for Renewable Portfolio Standard statute drafting).
246.
See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 95486 (2010) (establishing the
different methods available to fuel producers).
247.
See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070,
1094 (asserting that Methods 2A and 2B allows for out-of-state producers to
have individualized pathways).
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methods that were not common in California and therefore not
included in the default pathways.248
Another recommended practice for drafters of
environmental protection legislation comes from the Rocky
Mountain Ninth Circuit decision that the regional determinations
of CARB were not unconstitutional due to the narrow tailoring of
regulated regions.249 If states are able to show a reasonable basis
for where lines of regions are drawn they will be able to avoid
dormant Commerce Clause challenges similar to those brought by
RMFU. The Ninth Circuit held that the California border was a
legitimate grouping because it was tailored to match the realities
of ethanol production in the region.250
One option that has not been put into practice by any
group of states would be forming a coalition to enact multijurisdictional legislation that allowed for emissions monitoring,
reporting, and regulating for a region or group of states. The
enactment of such regulations would mitigate the concern of the
dormant Commerce Clause of one state acting to the detriment of
neighboring states. There is still a concern that states not inside
the regional groupings could challenge the legislation for
discriminating against interstate commerce. But if the groupings
were drawn based on what is being regulated and regional
similarities the potential of this would be diminished. An
example of this could be a regional grouping of coastal states at
the eastern seaboard drafting legislation to require a percentage
of electricity be produced using ocean based wind power, or even
tidal power plants.
Another potential alternative method of regulation can be
the compensatory tax doctrine.251 The doctrine has been affirmed
248.
See id. (concluding that the three methods provided by CARB
establish even-handed treatment under the Commerce Clause).
249.
See id. at 1096 (“The Fuel Standard’s regional categories for
the default pathways show every sign that they were chosen to accurately
measure and control GHGs and were not an attempt to protect California
ethanol producers.”).
250.
See id. at 1094 (holding that the California border was a
legitimate regional grouping).
251.
See generally Heddy Bolster, The Commerce Clause Meets
Environmental Protection: The Compensatory Tax doctrine as a Defense of
Potential Regional Carbon Dioxide Regulation, 47 B.C. L. Rev. 737 (2006)
(applying the compensatory tax doctrine to regulate “leakage” in tradition capand-trade programs).
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by the Supreme Court as a method of ensuring that no state,
including the out-of-state party, gains an unfair advantage
against another in interstate commerce. 252 The compensatory tax
doctrine would allow a state to impose taxes on out-of-state
producers that are equivalent to the taxes imposed on in-state
producers.253 The doctrine has three requirements for
constitutionality: (1) the state must identify the interstate tax
burden the State is attempting to compensate for, (2) the tax
must be roughly approximate—but not exceed—that placed on
interstate commerce, (3) finally, the events the tax is imposed on
must be substantially equivalent.254 In Oregon Waste Systems,
the Supreme Court held a tax on imported waste was not a valid
application of the compensatory tax doctrine because the tax
imposed on out-of-state waste was three times higher than that
imposed on in-state waste.255
The doctrine could be used as an alternative to the
California Fuel Standard’s cap-and-trade system.256 The tax could
be imposed pro rata based on carbon emissions that were
established through the lifecycle analysis. Carbon intensity
values could be broken into ranges with each range carrying a
different level of tax liability. The system would encourage
producers to change to alternative energy in an attempt to lower
their overall tax liability. The burden that would be imposed on
out-of-state producers would identical to that of in-state
producers because the tax liability would be tied to overall
emissions and not to the origin of the producer.
A final recommendation is one that states can utilize if—
or more likely when—they are faced with a dormant Commerce
Clause challenges. States considering drafting legislation aimed
at environmental protection—whether it is a cap-and-trade
252.
See Dep’t of Revenue of Wash. v. Assoc. of Wash. Stevedoring
Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 748 (1978) (stating that no state should get more than a just
share of interstate commerce).
253.
See Bolster, supra note 251, at 749–50 (discussing the case
Hinson v. Lott, 75 U.S. 148 (1869), and an Alabama law imposing a tax on outof-state liquor distillers equivalent to the tax imposed on in-state distillers).
254.
See Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 103
(1994) (explaining the requirements of the compensatory tax doctrine).
255.
See Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 108 (finding the tax
unconstitutional because of the unequal burden imposed on out-of-state waste).
256.
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(c) (West 2007)
(establishing the cap-and-trade system of the California Fuel Standard).
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system, a Renewable Portfolio Standard, or a regulatory scheme
that hasn’t even been thought of yet—should always be mindful
of alternative regulatory schemes to what they are implementing.
States should consider why these regulatory schemes are not
feasible in their situation. States should make an attempt to
document why regulatory schemes could not possibly be
successful under their unique circumstances. If faced with a
dormant Commerce Clause challenge states should present
evidence to the courts that will satisfy the dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence requiring that states acted with no nondiscriminatory
alternatives
available.
Though
this
recommendation is a last resort it is something that has worked
in the past,257 and states should be mindful of that fact.

VI. Conclusion
Due to a lack of Congressional action, and until there is
more Congressional action, states will be required to establish
their own environmental regulatory schemes. The nature and
scope of the environmental problem means these regulatory
schemes will impact interstate commerce and therefore implicate
the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. As of this writing, California’s Fuel Standard
awaits a review under the less intensive Pike balancing test in
the district court. The Ninth Circuit has denied RMFU’s petition
for a rehearing en banc.258 RMFU’s petition for certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court has also been denied.259
This Note introduced you to the jurisprudence, relevant
tests, and historical application of the dormant Commerce
Clause. Through the lens of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, v.
Corey this Note has provided direction to states looking to
understand the drafting requirements of environmental
257.
See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (finding a
statute, which discriminated on its face by restricting the importation of baitfish
in Maine, was acceptable under dormant Commerce Clause analysis because
Maine had a legitimate local interest in keeping non-native baitfish out of its
waters which could not be served by a nondiscriminatory alternative).
258.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507 (9th
Cir. 2014).
259.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 134 S. Ct. 2875, 189
L. Ed. 2d 835 (2014).
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legislation that avoids dormant Commerce Clause challenges. If
states are able to follow these recommendations their
environmental legislation will be effective and—hopefully—
protected from such challenges.

